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Judicial Authority and Qāḍīs’ Autonomy under the Abbasids 
 
 
Mathieu Tillier (Institut français du Proche-Orient, Beirut) 
 
 
Abstract: As Joseph Schacht argued in the 1950s, the office of qāḍī began in the Umayyad 
period as that of a “legal secretary” to provincial governors. Documentary evidence from Egypt 
confirms that governors were indeed regarded as being the highest judicial authority in early Islam, 
and that their legal powers far surpassed that of any other judge. In large cities, governors 
appointed and dismissed qāḍīs at their will; decisions taken by qāḍīs’ were could be swiftly 
overruled by political authorities. 
Although the Abbasids reformed and centralised the judiciary in the second half of eighth 
century AD, qāḍīs were still subordinate to reigning rulers and unable to impose judgements that 
displeased the caliph or his main representatives. The increasing political and social influence of 
scholars and the development of classical schools of law eventually changed this situation. Relying 
on a body of both narrative and legal literature, this paper addresses the qāḍīs’ attempts to resist 
political rulers’ interference with the judiciary by asserting themselves as true representatives of 
the shariʻa. It argues that Ḥanafi legal literature, dating from the ninth and tenth centuries AD, 
gradually elaborated a theory on the relationship between the qāḍī and the ruler; this theory was 
instrumental in doing away with political infringement on the judicial prerogative. This theory was 
soon incorporated into adab literature, whose stories of rulers entirely subjugated to the rule of law 
became a new political model.  
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Introduction 
 
The history of qāḍīs is mainly known through biographical dictionaries, written after the 
240s/850s, that attempt to reconstruct the lives of judges from the 1st century AH/9th century 
AD. Modern historians usually assume that individuals already held judicial responsibilities 
within the societies that developed following the first Islamic conquests, from the mid-
10s/630s onwards.1 The status of early qāḍīs remains obscure, however, and it is doubtful 
whether we will ever find enough evidence to obtain a clear picture of their actual position 
and responsibilities. Principal biographers of qāḍīs – Wakīʿ (d. 306/918) for Arabia and Iraq 
and al-Kindī (d. 350/961) for Egypt – wrote in the late ninth or in the tenth century, drawing 
from dry and scattered traditions. Such accounts were very similar in nature to ancient, non-
prophetic ḥadīth as recorded in early Muṣannafs of ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Ṣanʿānī (d. 211/827) or 
Ibn Abī Shayba (d. 235/849). These traditions were not designed to describe early judges’ 
lives or practices, but rather to record exempla within a broader context of the early formation 
of Islamic law. Systematic reconstruction of qāḍīs’ biographies only began in the second 
Abbasid period in the second half of the ninth century after new political and religious order 
was reached following the end of the miḥna. Relationships between scholars and rulers had 
                                                 
1 See for example Wael B. Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), pp. 34ff. 
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been subjected to tremendous ordeal, in which qāḍīs had played a major part. Following the 
caliph’s instruction, they had been the main instruments in the imposition of the doctrine of 
the created Qur’an. The cessation of the miḥna under caliph al-Mutawakkil (r. 232-247/847-
861) marked the victory of traditionalist scholars, who imposed themselves, at the expense of 
the caliph, as the only true religious authorities. The process leading to this new order had to 
be explained, understood and justified. While scholars like al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923) 
reformulated the whole of Islamic political history, others concentrated on key institutions 
like the judiciary, which stood at a junction between the political and legal domains. These 
historians did not look at the past in a neutral way. Although they did not hesitate to confront 
and report different versions of the same event, their whole enterprise was oriented toward a 
justification of the present. Notwithstanding the inherently subjective nature of these accounts 
which conveniently selected one fact over another, they still provide a coherent image which 
reveals actual historical tendencies. One of the main themes in historiographical literature 
dedicated to qāḍīs is their relationships with rulers. As is typical in Islamic historiography, 
sources describe all relationships in terms of personal connections; in reality such relations 
reveal deeper, structural patterns of interactions between institutions. 
One prominent underlying question concerning Islamic sources from the ninth and tenth 
centuries AD is that of judicial authority. Who holds this authority? Is it the caliph? Is it one 
of his direct representatives? Is it the judge? From the early Umayyads onward – or from even 
earlier periods – justice was dispensed by delegation: qāḍīs were appointed by political or 
military rulers. What did such delegation mean? To what extent did rulers reserve their right 
to monitor the judicial practice of their appointees? While Islam first developed as a military 
movement in which authority was vested in military rulers, the first three centuries of Islam 
witnessed the progressive affirmation of scholarly authority that challenged this initial order. 
How did the qāḍīs, who increasingly belonged to the class of such scholars, react to these 
changes? To what extent did they exercise sufficient authority to shape the society as they 
envisaged? 
In what follows, I shall try to highlight the main evolution of the relationship between 
qāḍīs and political rulers from the late Umayyad period until the tenth century AD. I will 
draw on both narrative and legal sources in order to show how a new notion of political and 
legal order was progressively promoted by Muslim scholars.  
 
1. The limited authority of qāḍīs under the Umayyads and early Abbasids 
 
1.1. Qāḍīs and governors 
According to sources, during the Umayyad period a large majority of qāḍīs was appointed 
by provincial or city governors. There are some exceptions, of course. Between 99/717 and 
114/733, three Umayyad caliphs are reported to have directly appointed qāḍīs.2 Yet these 
                                                 
2 R.G. Khoury, ʿAbd Allâh Ibn Lahîʿa (97-174/715-790) : Juge et grand maître de l’école égyptienne 
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1986), 15; id., “Zur Ernennung von Richtern im Islam vom Anfang bis zum 
Aufkommen der Abbasiden,” in Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des vorderen Orients. Festschrift für Bertold 
Spuler zum siebzigsten Geburtstag, ed. H.R. Roemer and A. Noth (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), 198ff; B. Johansen, 
“Wahrheit und Geltungsanspruch: zur Begründung und Begrenzung der Autorität des Qadi-Urteils im 
islamischen Recht,” in La Giustizia nell’alto medioevo (secoli IX-XI), ed. O. Capitani et alii (Spoleto: Centro 
italiano di studi sull’alto medioevo, 1997), pp. 985, 992. 
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exceptions are rare and such instances have only been reported in Egypt. Judges in Baṣra, 
Kūfa and Madīna were still duly appointed by local governors.3 The governors’ role in 
appointing qāḍīs led Joseph Schacht to present them as being “legal secretaries” of 
governors.4 The latter “retained […] the power of reserving for his own decision any lawsuit 
he wished”.5 Papyrological evidence suggests that the Egyptian governor was considered as 
the highest judicial authority in his province, and that some litigants filed their complaints 
with him directly.6 What would happen, then, when litigants referred their cases to a qāḍī? To 
what extent could the qāḍī deliver and implement decisions free from the influence of the 
governor? 
Steven Judd has recently argued that “[t]he general image of the Umayyad judicial system 
presented in the sources is one of judicial autonomy and independence.”7 His conclusions rely 
on narratives depicting a qāḍī defying a governor, or a governor obeying a qāḍī’s decision.8 
These narratives, however, are only an image of the past, reshaped by their authors’ or 
compilers’ interpretations. The story of Shurayḥ refusing to release a prisoner on the 
governor’s request, cited by Judd,9 is actually more than equivocal, as we have shown 
elsewhere. Other reports suggest that the same qāḍī, confronted to identical situations, could 
not seriously oppose the political authority.10 It is necessary to remember that the image of 
judicial independence that occasionally appears in sources about the Umayyad period was 
shaped during the Abbasid period, by authors whose agenda, as we shall see later, was to offer 
models of ideal relationships between the government and the judiciary. 
Judd’s conclusions about qāḍīs’ independence contradict his own vision of a judiciary used 
as a political and theological tool in the hands of the Umayyads.11 Furthermore, a qāḍī’s 
liberty was intrinsically limited by his hierarchical connection to the governor. His justice was 
that of a delegate, and he only held his position on a temporary basis. The governor could 
revoke his appointment at any time. The office of qāḍī was therefore characterised by its 
structural instability. Should a qāḍī’s judgement or attitude displease the delegating authority, 
the former could be immediately dismissed, without need for any justification. Moreover, 
qāḍīs received a salary which eventually grew to become quite a comfortable sum under the 
last Umayyad caliphs, and even more so under the early Abbasids. They enjoyed a standard of 
living comparable to that of other high-ranking civil servants. The assumption therefore is that 
those judges who did not have other sources of high income would be tempted to preserve 
                                                 
3 See D. Sourdel, “Les cadis de Baṣra d’après Wakīʿ,” Arabica, 2 (1955), 112-114; Wakīʿ, Aḫbār al-quḍāt, éd. 
ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Muṣṭafā al-Marāġī (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-saʿāda, 1947-1950), I, pp. 124-200; II, pp. 406-413; III, 
pp. 3-36. 
4 J. Schacht, An Introduction to Islamic Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 25. 
5 Ibid. 
6 M. Tillier, “Du pagarque au cadi : ruptures et continuités dans l’administration judiciaire de la Haute-Égypte 
(Ier-IIIe/VIIe-IXe siècle),” Médiévales, 64 (2013), 23-5. 
7 S.C. Judd, Religious Scholars and the Umayyads. Piety-Minded Supporters of the Marwānid Caliphate 
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), p.102. 
8 Ibid., pp. 100-1. 
9 Ibid. Judd cites Ibn ʿAsākir, Ta’rīkh Madīnat Dimashq (Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1995-2000), 23: 26. The reference 
should however be corrected as 23: 30. 
10 M. Tillier, Les cadis d’Iraq et l’État abbasside (132/750-334/945) (Damascus: Presses de l’Ifpo, 2009), 
pp. 499-500. 
11 Judd, Religious Scholars, pp. 98-9. Judd also admits that in some cities (especially Baṣra, but also  Madīna), 
governors were more likely to interfere with judicial practice, and that qāḍīs had to seek the support of the caliph 
against recalcitrant governors. Ibid., pp. 112-3, 124. 
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their position at all costs. Scholars who reflected on the judiciary were well aware of this 
tendency and suggested that no qāḍī should be paid for a task that should be regarded first and 
foremost as a religious duty.12 
Narratives depicting qāḍīs’ resistance to governors mainly illustrate the fact that political 
authorities did not recognise the independence of the judiciary. More generally, literary 
sources report numerous cases of governors’ interventions in qāḍīs’ judicial activities. The 
historical significance of such reports has been challenged by Wael Hallaq, who regards 
encroachments on the judiciary as exceptional cases that were “statistically out of proportion” 
from the norm.13 This statement somehow misses the value of narrative sources. Arab Muslim 
authors did not intend to focus on exceptional events or to provide an exhaustive tool for use 
by modern historians to perform statistical analysis; their intention was rather to exemplify 
certain relevant and significant situations. Authors like Wakīʿ and al-Kindī wrote at a time 
when relationships between rulers and the judiciary were reaching a new equilibrium which 
benefited the scholars,14 and they therefore had good reasons to highlight (or even re-
elaborate) ancient examples of “orthodox” relationships between judges and rulers. 
Nevertheless, their writings reveal tensions which would not have been recorded but for their 
historical relevance. Governors intervened in the judicial process and could undermine the 
qāḍīs’ decisions. One of the best documented instances of such interference is the release of 
prisoners by governors although they had been detained by qāḍīs. 
During the late Umayyad and early Abbasid period, qāḍīs did not have a dedicated prison 
for “their” prisoners – such prisoners were litigants they had placed in preventive or 
administrative detention or incarcerated as discretionary punishment (taʿzīr).15 Qāḍīs were 
obliged to turn to governors who allowed them use of their prison and their jailers. This put 
the qāḍī in an awkward position of having his prisoners detained in a structure belonging to 
the governor’s authority.16 Theoretically, an institution with the power to imprison someone 
should also have sole responsibility for his release. In practice, however, as prisons were 
controlled by governors, they could free prisoners whenever they wished. Wakīʿ relates an 
incident which probably occurred in 126/744, in the reign of caliph Yazīd b. al-Walīd 
(r. 126/744). ʿĀmir b. ʿUbayda al-Bāhilī, the qāḍī of Baṣra for the governor ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī 
ʿUṯmān,17 imprisoned a litigant at the request of his adversary, presumably for a debt he could 
not or would not repay. However, as the governor had personal ties to the prisoner, he 
released the prisoner almost immediately. Imprisonment being the principal means of 
compelling a debtor to repay his creditor, the adversary notified the qāḍī of the prisoner’s 
release. The qāḍī regarded this release as unjust infringement upon his judicial practice and 
quitted his court and, as a means of exerting pressure against the governor, he remained at 
                                                 
12 See Tillier, Les cadis d’Iraq et l’État abbasside, pp. 270-2. 
13 Hallaq, The Origins and Evolution, p. 190. See also Judd, Religious Scholars, p. 133. 
14 See infra. 
15 On the different types of imprisonment in classical Islam, see I. Schneider, “Imprisonment in Pre-Classical and 
Classical Islamic Law,” Islamic Law and Society, 2 (1995), p. 156-168. 
16 See M. Tillier, “Prisons et autorités urbaines,” Arabica, 55 (2008), p. 392-7. 
17 ʿAbd Allāh b. Abī ʿUthmān was briefly governor of Baṣra in 126/744. See Khalīfa b. Khayyāṭ, Ta’rīḫ, ed. 
Muṣṭafā Najīb Fawwāz and Ḥikmat Kashlī Fawwāz (Beirut: Dār al-kutub al-ʿilmiyya, 1995), p. 241; Ch. Pellat, 
Le Milieu baṣrien et la formation de Ğāḥiẓ (Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1953), p. 280. ʿĀmir b. ʿUbayda had 
been appointed in 120/738 by governor al-Qāsim b. Muḥammad al-Thaqafī. See al-Ṭabarī, Ta’rīḫ al-rusul wa-l-
mulūk, ed. Muḥammad Abū l-Faḍl Ibrāhīm (Cairo: Dār al-maʿārif, 1967), VII, pp. 159, 179, 299. 
5 
 
home for several days. The governor, not appreciating such an example of pre-modern 
industrial action, ordered the qāḍī to resume his judicial duties, but the qāḍī persisted in his 
refusal. The governor did not allow the prisoner to be incarcerated once again, eventually 
dismissing ʿĀmir b. ʿUbayda and appointing another qāḍī in his place.18 
Similar situations are reported from the early Abbasid period, at a time when governors 
still appointed their qāḍīs, in places such as Fusṭāṭ19, Baṣra20 and Kūfa21. In early Abbasid 
cases, a new pattern emerges whereby governors commonly yield to the qāḍīs’ pressure and 
send their prisoners back to jail. It is likely, however, that the Umayyad qāḍīs lacked effective 
means to impose their own independent judicial authority. They had either to comply with the 
governors’ will or relinquish their positions.22 Thus the judicial system rested upon a 
fundamental ambiguity. On the one hand, governors regarded themselves as sole proprietors 
of judicial authority. Qāḍīs were their subordinates and they could therefore intervene in their 
lawsuits and decisions as they saw fit. On the other hand, governors accepted to delegate their 
authority and asked judges to act in their place. As soon as qāḍīs claimed an authority of their 
own, arising from their religious knowledge, this ambiguity gave rise to competition. If 
narratives reflect actual historical reality, qāḍīs regarded their decisions as binding to the 
effect that governors had to respect them despite being their direct superiors. These two 
visions of judicial authority could not be reconciled. 
 
1.2. Qāḍīs and caliphs 
The judiciary was not immediately affected by the Abbasid revolution. For many years, 
under al-Saffāḥ (r. 132-136/749-754) and his brother al-Manṣūr (r. 136-158/754-775), 
provincial and city governors kept their judicial prerogatives by continuing to appoint qāḍīs. 
During the second part of his reign, however, al-Manṣūr began a major administrative reform 
of the judiciary. Around the time he founded Madīnat al-Salām and transferred the Abbasid 
capital to Bagdad, al-Manṣūr undertook an unprecedented centralisation of the judiciary– 
centralisation which would only be completed under his successors. Henceforth, caliphs 
would directly appoint qāḍīs of the empire. By taking away the power of appointment of 
qāḍīs from governors, al-Manṣūr may have intentionally weakened the latters’ authority (too 
strong governors would become potential rebels) in order to increase the caliph’s grasp on the 
state. Moreover, in appointing qāḍīs within the empire he probably wanted the new dynasty to 
appear as guarantor of justice and equity throughout the provinces, thereby enhancing its 
legitimacy. As a consequence of this reform, allusions to rivalry between qāḍīs and governors 
almost disappear from sources dealing with later periods.  
This shift in the power of appointment from the governor to the caliph however still failed 
to resolve lingering questions over judicial authority. The caliph in fact now considered 
                                                 
18 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz Muṣṭafā al-Marāghī (Cairo: Maṭbaʿat al-saʿāda, 1947-1950), II, 
pp. 43-44. 
19 Ibid., III, p. 232; al-Kindī, Akhbār quḍāt Miṣr, in The Governors and Judges of Egypt, ed. R. Guest (Leyden: 
Brill, 1912), p. 356.  
20 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, II, pp. 69-70; cf. Ibn al-Jawzī, al-Muntaẓam fī tawārīkh al-mulūk wa-l-umam, ed. 
Suhayl Zakkār (Beirut: Dār al-fikr, 1995), VI, p. 527. About these cases, see Tillier, Les cadis d’Iraq, pp. 499-
503. 
21 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, III, p. 151-52.  
22 See Tillier, Les cadis d’Iraq, p. 500. 
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himself to be the actual holder of judicial authority he had delegated to the qāḍīs. In certain 
circumstances, caliphs behaved like governors of the previous period, and tried to impose 
their judicial authority against the will of their qāḍīs. Among diverse examples reported by 
narrative literature, that of ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan al-ʿAnbarī (qāḍī from 156/773 to 
166/782-83)23 is probably the most significant. 
ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan al-ʿAnbarī was a qāḍī of Baṣra at a time when major issues were 
raised about the status of fertile lands in southern Iraq (the sawād). Caliph al-Mahdī (r. 158-
169/775-785) tried to use ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan to implement a reform of the fiscal status 
of lands surrounding Baṣra by extending the area submitted to kharāj. However, ʿUbayd 
Allāh defended the interests of the local people and actively resisted the caliph’s orders.24 On 
a judicial level, changes of properties in the aftermath of the Abbasid revolution caused major 
conflicts in Baṣra. The caliph Abū l-ʿAbbās al-Saffāḥ had for instance offered land to a man 
called Sulaymān b. ʿUbayd Allāh. Members of another local family, the Banū ʿAbd al-Malik, 
claimed ownership of that land. They asserted that it had belonged to their ancestor after the 
conquest of Iraq, and that it had been unjustly confiscated by the caliph Sulaymān b. ʿAbd al-
Malik (r. 96-99/715-717). The conflict led to a lawsuit before ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan 
resulting in a major stand-off between the qāḍī and the caliph. 
The caliph al-Mahdī intervened twice in the lawsuit, in two different ways. He was first 
solicited by the claimants, the Banū ʿAbd al-Malik, whose claim the qāḍī was reported to 
favour. The qāḍī had suggested that the claimants should file a complaint directly to the 
caliph in Baghdad, and one can assume that the suggestion was made with the intention of 
lending more weight to his decision. The claimants did so by presenting the caliph or his 
administration with a petition (or so we think), including the identity of their adversary and an 
outline of the issue being litigated. In return, the caliph wrote a letter to the qāḍī, in which he 
ordered him to hear the case and to render a judgment according to evidence provided by the 
litigants.25 This procedure “by rescript” was a legacy from the Umayyad period, during which 
litigants would commonly present a complaint before a ruler (the caliph or, more often, a 
governor) who would then issue instructions to the judge.26 In this instance, the intervention 
of the caliph in judicial proceedings was encouraged by the qāḍī and could not therefore be 
regarded as an infringement of the judge’s prerogatives. It was simply part of accepted 
procedure – even though evidence of this type of procedure eventually disappeared from 
subsequent sources. 
The caliph’s second intervention, however, was of different nature. According to Wakīʿ, 
the qāḍī ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan ignored the caliph’s order to listen to evidences presented 
by the defendant (Muḥammad b. Sulaymān b. ʿUbayd Allāh) and condemned him instead. In 
doing so, the qāḍī may have been respecting the law of evidence widely acknowledged by 
                                                 
23 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, II, p. 109. On this qāḍī, see M. Tillier, “Un traité politique du IIe/VIIIe siècle. L’épître 
de ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan al-ʿAnbarī au calife al-Mahdī, ” Annales Islamologiques, 40 (2006), pp. 140-5; 
J. van Ess, “La liberté du juge dans le milieu basrien du VIIIe siècle,” in La notion de liberté au Moyen Age : 
Islam, Byzance, Occident (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1985), pp. 28-9; id., Theologie und Gesellschaft im 2. und 3. 
Jahrhundert Hidschra (Berlin-New York, Walter de Gruyter, 1991), II, pp. 155-64. 
24 Tillier, “Un traité politique,” pp. 142-3, 148. 
25 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, II, p. 193. 
26 See M. Tillier, “Dispensing Justice in a Minority Context: the Judicial Administration of Upper Egypt under 
Muslim Rule (Early Eighth Century CE),” in Robert Hoyland (ed.), Minorities in Late Antiquity and Early 
Islam: legal, cultural and economic perspectives (Princeton: The Darwin Press, forthcoming). 
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scholars of his day which states that “the burden of the proof lies upon the claimant”. 
According to this rule, a judge had to decide in favour of a claimant if he succeeded in 
producing reliable testimonial evidence, and should not take the defendant’s evidence into 
consideration.27 The caliph, however, would not accept the qāḍī’s disobedience, especially 
since the defendant had received the disputed land from the first Abbasid caliph. The qāḍī’s 
decision was therefore perceived to challenge both the honour and judicial authority of the 
Abbasid caliphs. Al-Mahdī wrote a new letter to the qāḍī ordering him to make a public 
confession about the injustice of his judgment and to issue a fresh decision in favour of the 
defendant. If the qāḍī refused to comply, the caliph would order to have him decapitated. The 
qāḍī had no choice but to revise his judgement.28 Here the caliph did not act as an appeal 
institution . He did not revise the judgement nor issue a new verdict, but rather forced the qāḍī 
to do so. He interfered with ʿUbayd Allāh’s practice and his threatening order meant he 
considered the judge to be a subordinate who had to comply with his superior’s will. 
 
2. When qāḍīs and jurists claimed autonomous judgeship 
 
2.1. Resistance to caliphal interventions 
ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan al-ʿAnbarī’s case reflects a new conception of justice in the early 
Abbasid period. Procedural rules had been extensively discussed by jurists during the last 
Umayyads and, despite secondary disagreements (ikhtilāf), Muslim jurists had now achieved 
an almost unified vision of the judicial process. If early qāḍīs had sometimes been chosen 
amongst individuals whom later biographical literature would not recognise as scholars, 
respected jurists were now commonly appointed as qāḍīs. ʿUbayd Allāh was himself a 
prominent scholar of the ancient Baṣran legal trend. This new generation of qāḍīs regarded 
itself as expert in laws and procedures, and was increasingly intolerant of interventions by 
caliphs in legal matters. ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan repeatedly resisted al-Mahdī’s instructions, 
and according to the later narrative of al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdāḍī, he was eventually dismissed 
because of his disobedience of the caliph’s orders.29 
Narrative literature contains similar instances of resistance to caliphs’ interventions in the 
legal arena. Ḥammād b. Dalīl, qāḍī of al-Madā’in (the old Seleucia-Ctesiphon), resisted the 
orders of Hārūn al-Rashīd (r. 170-193/786-809) and fled to Makka to escape punishment.30 A 
qāḍī of Khurāsān refused likewise to obey the instructions of al-Ma’mūn (r. 198-218/813-
833) concerning a lawsuit.31 After the miḥna, interventions of caliphs in judicial practice seem 
to disappear, and tensions between rulers and qāḍīs tend henceforward to focus on the 
judiciary’s administrative tasks – especially the pious foundations (waqfs) whose revenues 
were prone to appropriation by many rulers.32 
                                                 
27 In a shorter version of this story reported by al-Khaṭīb, the qāḍī explained to the caliph that he had rejected his 
letter “because it was full of mistakes (malḥūn)” and therefore did not appear to be actually written by the caliph 
(al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Ta’rīkh Madīnat al-salām, ed. Bashshār ʿAwwād Maʿrūf (Beirut: Dār al-gharb al-islāmī, 
2001) 12: 10). It is possible that these “mistakes” are allusions to an error in the procedure. 
28 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, II, pp. 94-5. 
29 Al-Khaṭīb also mentions a lawsuit between a merchant and an officer, in which al-Mahdī ordered the qāḍī to 
issue a verdict in favour of the officer. Al-Khaṭīb, Ta’rīkh Madīnat al-salām, XII, pp. 10-1. 
30 Wakīʿ, Akhbār al-quḍāt, III, p. 304. 
31 Al-Jahshiyārī, Kitāb al-wuzarā’ wa-l-kuttāb (Beirut: Dār al-fikr al-ḥadīṯ, 1988), p. 205. 
32 See Tillier, Les cadis d’Iraq, pp. 645, 648. 
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It took some time before jurists could impose the idea that qāḍīs should dispense justice 
without any interference from rulers. The first jurist who began to theorize this idea was 
ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan al-ʿAnbarī himself. It is no coincidence that literary sources 
remembered this qāḍī as being actively disobeying caliphal instructions. He is indeed the 
author of an important epistle to the caliph al-Mahdī, in which he addressed four domains of 
state administration: management of frontiers, administration of justice, and two different 
kinds of tax revenues (fay’ and ṣadaqa).33 Patricia Crone and Martin Hinds were the first to 
highlight the provocative nature of this epistle, in which al-a’immat al-fuqahā’ (the imams-
jurists) are the scholars, not the caliph.34 As Muhammad Qasim Zaman noticed, ʿUbayd Allāh 
b. al-Ḥasan does not deny the legal role of the caliph in certain issues where other sources of 
law are silent.35 However, the role of the caliph is much more limited in the four domains that 
ʿUbayd Allāh addresses in detail. In the epistle by ʿUbayd Allāh there is no mention of 
caliphs’ instructions as being the source of judge’s decisions, and it is clear that he does not 
expect justice to be an area where caliphal instructions should be expected.36  
ʿUbayd Allāh is one of the earliest authors whose positive definition of sources of law has 
been preserved. In the part of his epistle dedicated to judgeship, he states that every judge 
should rely on the Qur’ān, the sunna of the Prophet (without any positive definition of the 
term sunna),37 the consensus (ijmāʿ) of leading jurists (a’immat al-fuqahā’) and finally his 
own individual reasoning (ijtihād al-ḥākim) in consultation with other knowledgeable 
scholars.38 The right to rely on ijtihād belongs first and foremost to the caliph. However, 
ʿUbayd Allāh considers that the delegation of judicial authority by the caliph to the judge 
usually indicates the delegation of the right to rely on ijtihād.39 Results of the judge’s own 
reflexions are therefore fully legitimate, not to be overruled by the caliph’s own conclusions. 
By defending the idea that “any mujtahid is right” (kull mujtahid muṣīb) and applying it to the 
qāḍī,40 ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan planted the seeds of an explicit theory on judicial 
independence.  
  
2.2. Legal developments of qāḍīs’ autonomy 
ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan al-ʿAnbarī wrote his epistle at a time when Islamic law was 
entering its “literary” stage. It is not until the end of the eighth century AD that we see the 
development of a more “fixed” body of legal writings, with the diffusion of authored epistles 
and handbooks.41 The support enjoyed by Abū Ḥanīfa’s followers from the reign of al-Mahdī 
onwards eventually led to the formation of a large Ḥanafī school which absorbed other Iraqi 
                                                 
33 Wakīʿ, Aḫbār al-quḍāt, III, p. 97-107 (French translation in Tillier, “Un traité politique,” p. 155-67). About 
this epistle, see also P. Crone and M. Hinds, God’s Caliph. Religious Authority in the First Centuries of Islam 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 98; M.Q. Zaman, “The Caliphs, the ʿUlamā’, and the Law: 
Defining the Role and Function of the Caliph in the Early ʿAbbāsid Period,” Islamic Law and Society, 4 (1997), 
p. 12. 
34 Crone and Hinds, God’s Caliph, p. 98. 
35 Wakīʿ, Aḫbār al-quḍāt, II, p. 105. See Zaman, “The Caliphs, the ʿUlamā’, and the Law,” p. 11. 
36 Wakīʿ, Aḫbār al-quḍāt, II, p. 105. 
37 Cf. Tillier, “Un traité politique,” pp. 145-7. 
38 Wakīʿ, Aḫbār al-quḍāt, II, p. 101. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Tillier, “Un traité politique,” p. 153. 
41 On the notion of “fixed” text, see G. Schoeler, The Oral and the Written in Early Islam (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2006), pp. 33-5. 
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legal trends (Ibn Abī Laylā’s, a part of Baṣra’s trend, among others).42 Ḥanafī jurists were 
authors of books which soon became, according to al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/868), standard literature in 
training to become a judge.43 The most famous among such literature were Ḥanafī treaties of 
legal formulas (shurūṭ).44 The formation of other legal madhhabs and the constitution of a 
wider, fixed corpus of Islamic jurisprudence, conceived at the very latest by the early ninth 
century AD, transformed the relationship between Muslims and law.45 Previous legal 
literature was “organic” in nature in that it was redacted by successive scholars from their 
master’s teaching. Such literature was prone to amendments and modifications over time. 
Unlike organic literature, fixed texts and legal handbooks constituted a framework of 
reference that could not easily be manipulated or altered.  
It is likely that these changes had important consequences for the judiciary. From the 
ninth-century onwards, qāḍīs could justify their decisions on grounds of a widely accepted 
body of rules and norms. Fiqh elaborated by private jurists did not only theorise what was 
lawful and unlawful, or what penalty should be applied, but also fixed judicial procedures.46 It 
therefore became increasingly difficult for political rulers to justify their encroachments upon 
the judiciary. If we consider how caliphal infringements upon the judiciary were described in 
literary sources, we can see significant changes taking place between the late eighth and the 
late ninth centuries AD. Whereas qāḍīs who resisted caliphal instructions in the eighth-
century were typically sanctioned, a new pattern emerged during the ninth century, where 
qāḍīs could impose their views upon rulers. In fact, the status of qāḍīs improved to such an 
extent that they were recognised as authentic defenders of the legal order. The legitimacy 
conferred upon their decisions as a result of their enhanced legal standing allowed qāḍīs to 
reject approaches by caliphs or viziers who intervened to protect their preferred litigants or 
tried to appropriate waqfs or orphans’ properties.47 Literary sources reflect a new pattern in 
which qāḍīs had more room to manoeuvre and impose their voices.  
On a theoretical level, during the third/ninth century, Ḥanafī jurists began to question the 
link between the caliph and his qāḍīs.48 According to the jurist al-Khaṣṣāf (d. 261/874), the 
qāḍī could issue a judgement against the caliph, despite the former being a deputy of the 
latter.49 There was, however, a paradox in this statement: if judicial authority derived from the 
appointment of a judge by the caliph, why would the latter have to submit to the judgement of 
his own delegate? How could the caliph be at the same time the ultimate source of judicial 
                                                 
42 See N. Tsafrir, The History of an Islamic School of Law. The Early Spread of Hanafism (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2004), pp. 116-8. 
43 Al-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-Ḥayawān, ed. ʿAbd al-Salām Muḥammad Hārūn (Cairo: Maktabat Muṣṭafā al-Bābī al-
Ḥalabī, 1938-45), I, p. 87. 
44 J. Wakin, The Function of Documents in Islamic Law. The Chapters on Sales from Ṭaḥāwī’s Kitāb al-shurūṭ 
al-kabīr (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1972), p. 16. 
45 For the emergence of fixed books in the Mālikī school, see J.E. Brockopp, Early Mālikī Law. Ibn ʿAbd al-
Ḥakam and his Major Compendium of Jurisprudence (Leiden: Brill, 2000), pp. 72, 111-112. 
46 Tillier, Les cadis d’Iraq, 47-9. 
47 Ibid., 646-8. 
48 Ḥanafī jurists had been supported by the caliphate since the second half of the eighth century AD, and a 
majority of qāḍīs were still chosen among them. Their discussion of the qāḍī’s autonomy, which (to the best of 
my knowledge) has no early parallel in other madhhabs, was probably motivated by their long experience of 
ruler-judge relationships. 
49 Al-Khaṣṣāf, Kitāb Adab al-qāḍī, ed. Farḥāt Ziyāda (Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 1978), 
p. 405. 
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power and yet be a simple litigant?  
Later jurists and scholars tried their best to solve this paradox by minimising the caliph’s 
role in judicial organisation. Although the caliph formally appointed qāḍīs, he was not the 
ultimate source of judicial authority. In his introduction to Akhbār al-quḍāt, Wakīʿ alluded to 
the fact that all judicial authority came from God and that caliphs were forced to submit to 
judicial control as they would submit to God.50 According to literary sources, several qāḍīs 
used the same argument to reject caliphal instructions.51 However, placing the caliph as an 
intermediary between God and the Muslims was a dangerous idea. It could pave the way for a 
claim that the caliph was the deputy of God on earth, inviting even more trouble for qāḍīs 
trying to impose their legal decisions. Another solution was to place the qāḍī under the 
authority of another entity. A century after al-Khaṣṣāf, al-Jaṣṣāṣ (d. 370/980) eventually found 
a solution. Using a newly developed concept, that of farḍ kifāya,52 this Ḥanafī jurist stated 
that the qāḍī did not dispense justice on behalf of the caliph, but rather on behalf of the 
Muslim community. How then, could he explain the fact that the qāḍī was still appointed by 
the caliph? Al-Jaṣṣāṣ replied that the qāḍī was indeed a representative (wakīl) of the caliph, 
but that the latter was himself a representative (wakīl) of the community.53 According to 
Ḥanafī law, the wakīl of another wakīl did not act on behalf of the person who appointed him, 
but rather on behalf of the individual who stood at the top of the pyramid of delegations.54 
Although he was appointed by the caliph, the qāḍī was therefore actually a representative of 
the Muslims. The qāḍī served the Muslim community, not the caliph, on the basis of laws 
formulated by the legal scholars (fuqahāʾ). According to this theory, a qāḍī could be 
appointed by rebels (Khārijites), and even by the community itself in the absence of a ruler.55 
In theory at least, any relationship of authority that previously existed between the caliph and 
the qāḍī was now dissolved and the caliph could no longer justify his interventions in the 
daily practice of his judges. 
 
2.3. A new model of judicial autonomy: the example of adab literature 
Al-Jaṣṣāṣ developed his theory in the context of a weakened Abbasid caliphate. From 
334/945 onwards, the Būyids became the actual rulers and most of the caliph’s state 
prerogatives were transferred to the amīr al-umarā’, at times even including the appointment 
of qāḍīs.56 Because of their political position, caliphs could no longer claim any actual control 
over daily administration of the judiciary. In this context, proclaiming theoretical 
independence of qāḍīs vis-à-vis the caliphate was an easier task for the jurists than it had been 
in the late second/eighth century.  
This theory paved the way for the development of a political model that was soon 
embraced by adab literature. Narratives about qāḍīs who disobeyed the caliph’s orders, or of 
rulers who eventually admitted the rightfulness of their judge, were already part of the 
                                                 
50 Wakīʿ, Aḫbār al-quḍāt, I, 1.  
51 See Tillier, Les cadis d’Iraq, pp. 633-4. 
52 See E. Tyan, Histoire de l’organisation judiciaire en pays d’Islam (Leiden: Brill, 1960), p. 113; Th.W. 
Juynboll, « Farḍ », EI2, II, 790. 
53 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in al-Khaṣṣāf, Kitāb Adab al-qāḍī, pp. 355-6, 363-4. 
54 Al-Sarakhsī, al-Mabsūṭ (Beirut: Dār al-maʿrifa, 1406 H.), XIX, p. 159. 
55 Al-Jaṣṣāṣ, in al-Khaṣṣāf, Kitāb Adab al-qāḍī, pp. 30-1. 
56 Tillier, Les cadis d’Iraq, pp. 130-1. 
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biographical works of the early tenth century AD. It is only in the late tenth century, however, 
that books exclusively dedicated to the relationships between the judiciary and the state began 
to appear. In what follows, I will draw on a short adab book by the famous author Abū Hilāl 
al-ʿAskarī (d. c. 400/1010), entitled Kitāb mā iḥtakama bi-hi al-khulafā’ ilā l-quḍāt (The Book 
of Cases Submitted by Caliphs to Judges).57 Abū Hilāl lived in Khūzistān under the Būyid 
dynasty only two or three decades after al-Jaṣṣāṣ, and belongs to this generation of scholars 
who took advantage of the new political situation to develop models that had been mere 
sketches until then.  
The core of Abū Hilāl’s book is a series of akhbār all built on a similar pattern: a caliph is 
in conflict with someone (usually a commoner) and accepts to submit his case to an arbiter or 
a judge. Eventually, the arbiter or the judge decides against the caliph and the latter accepts 
his condemnation. The author provides a series of examples, from the time of the so-called 
Rāshidūn caliphs until the reign of al-Muhtadī (r. 255-256/869-870). Although there is no 
direct link between this little book and the legal theory developed by al-Jaṣṣāṣ, they both draw 
upon the same idea: that of autonomous judgeship.  
In Abū Hilāl’s “theory” of government – as it appears through his narratives – the just ruler 
must submit to law and to the judgment of its representatives, especially the qāḍīs. Abū Hilāl 
was not a jurist, though, and he does not provide any legal justification for this pattern. As an 
adīb, he finds justification in the exemplary behaviour of ancient rulers, especially those of 
the Persian tradition. The first models of such just rulers are the Sassanian kings who, as 
pseudo-Jāḥiẓ developed in his Kitāb al-Tāj, submitted willingly to the justice of the mōbedān 
mōbed once a year.58 According to Abū Hilāl, the Prophet agreed to submit a litigation 
opposing him to his wife ʿĀ’isha to an arbiter.59 So did the first caliphs, like ʿUmar b. al-
Khaṭṭāb when a conflict arose between him and Ubayy b. Kaʿb. ʿUmar is depicted as model of 
a just ruler, who not only agrees to appear before an arbiter, but who also wants to be treated 
as a common human being regardless of his office or high rank. When the arbiter (Zayd b. 
Thābit) suggests that the caliph sit next to him – which would symbolically put him on a 
higher level than his adversary – ʿUmar refuses and asks to sit next to his adversary on an 
equal footing with the latter.60 Until the appearance of al-Muhtadī as the last incarnation of 
justice, the Umayyad61 and Abbasid caliphs62 exemplify the willingness of rulers to submit to 
the strict rules of judicial procedure and accept decisions rendered against them or their close 
relatives.63 Even though he cannot conceal al-Mahdī’s wrath due to ʿUbayd Allāh b. al-Ḥasan 
al-ʿAnbarī’s famous resistance to his will, Abū Hilāl portrays the caliph as being ready, at 
first, to submit to his adjudication. Whereas Wakīʿ reports that the caliph ordered the qāḍī to 
levy the kharāj on a large part of Baṣra’s territory, Abū Hilāl states that the caliph asked 
                                                 
57 Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, Le Livre des califes qui s’en remirent au jugement d’un cadi, ed. M. Tillier (Cairo: 
Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 2011). 
58 Ibid., p. 3/trans. p. 18. Cf. Pseudo-Jāḥiẓ, Kitāb al-tāj fī akhlāq al-mulūk, ed. Ahmed Zéki Pacha (Cairo: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1914), pp. 159-63. 
59 Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, Le Livre des califes, p. 8/trans. p. 24. 
60 Ibid., p. 10/trans. pp. 27-8. 
61 Ibid., p. 11/trans. pp. 28-9. 
62 Ibid., p. 11-8/trans. pp. 29-37. 
63 See also M. Tillier, “La société abbasside au miroir du tribunal. Égalité juridique et hiérarchie sociale,” 
Annales Islamologiques, 42 (2008), pp. 160-1. 
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ʿUbayd Allāh to adjudicate his dispute with the inhabitants of Baṣra on that matter.64 Abū 
Hilāl goes so far as to claim that al-Manṣūr threatened to dismiss the qāḍī of Madīna if the 
latter showed him any sign of respect during the hearing of a dispute which opposed him to 
camel drivers.65 This is an odd reversal of situation if we compare this version to Wakīʿ’s or 
al-Kindī’s biographies, in which qāḍīs are more often dismissed for having disobeyed a 
caliphal order. 
In the late-tenth century, owing to new political and religious situation of the empire, 
certain scholars were able to freely express a view of the caliphate that others had refrained 
from expressing for over two centuries. According to their vision, the caliph was no more than 
a normal human being who had to submit to the law. The true representative of God and of 
His law should be the qāḍī. The caliph is still regarded as a model for his subjects in Abū 
Hilāl’s book. However, this pattern is turned upside down: if the caliph wants to become a 
model, he must behave as a normal human being. And if he wishes to not only become a just 
ruler, but also to reach the level of being an authentic upholder of the law, he must imitate a 
higher model, that of the qāḍī. 
 
Conclusion 
Justice is a major expression of the ruler’s sovereignty. However, the development of 
Islam as a “religion of law” required the submission of all human beings – even their political 
leaders – to the sharīʿa. Tensions between the judiciary and political rulers over judicial 
authority were inevitable, and were accountable for some of the major evolutions in Islamic 
institutions during the first four centuries AH/seventh to tenth century AD.  
Umayyad caliphs considered themselves as representatives of God on earth and many 
Muslims accepted them as the best embodiment or interpreters of the sharīʿa. In difficult 
cases, both qāḍīs and governors turned towards them and sought their rulings.66 In practice, 
however, the Umayyad empire was quite decentralised. Provincial governors exercised more 
control over judicial practices than caliphs, and thus were able to impose their views on their 
qāḍīs.  
Although the centralisation of qāḍīs’ appointments under al-Manṣūr and his successors 
eliminated such judicial authority being exercised by governors, qāḍīs still had to confront 
judicial interference from caliphs. Contemporaneous developments in Islamic law within new 
madhhabs however divorced the legal system from political institutions. Private scholars, 
some of them recruited as qāḍīs, claimed that they alone possessed the ability to define right 
from wrong, and rejected the caliph’s role as a legal source. Their scholarly writings provided 
qāḍīs with a major tool for legitimising their decisions and for asserting their autonomy vis-à-
vis the caliphate. Qāḍīs became increasingly their own masters in the legal field. In practice, 
qāḍīs were still part of social and political networks and could therefore rarely obtain actual 
independence. In theory, however, jurists and other scholars developed a highly sophisticated 
discourse proving that qāḍīs were magistrates whose authority could not be abolished by 
                                                 
64 Abū Hilāl al-ʿAskarī, Le Livre des califes, pp. 13-14/trans. pp. 32-3. Cf. Wakīʿ, Aḫbār al-quḍāt, II, pp. 92, 96-
7. 
65 Ibid., pp. 12-3/trans. p. 31. 
66 See M. Tillier, “Califes, émirs et cadis : le droit califal et l’articulation de l’autorité judiciaire à l’époque 
umayyade,” Bulletin d’Études Orientales, 63 (2014), forthcoming. 
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rulers. This theory reflected a political model which was the exact opposite of the so-called 
“oriental despotism”. The model was no less than what is now called the “rule of law”. Such 
developments do not mean that political rulers relinquished their judicial authority. However 
they had to find a new theoretical framework which is still to be explored. 
 
